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Introduction of the Minister to a Free Conference in a Committee of the Whole Congress [Notes by W. H. Drayton.] MONDAY, February 15, 1779. He informed the Committee that his master, actuated by the most friendly regard to the United States, had ordered him to acquaint them that a great revolution had taken place in Great Britain respecting the question of their independence; that there had been a great party in the Cabinet Council of that nation in favor of that independence; that they were willing to grant that independence with certain conditions; that those conditions were somewhat similar to those proposed by the late commissioners; that they principally respected a kind of Federal Union, such as that the United States should assist Great Britain in her wars; that, however, this measure had been laid aside, the Cabinet being impressed with the representation of the Commissioners that divisions prevailed among the members in Congress, and between the Congress and some of the States; that by the operations of the Commissioners a foundation was laid upon which discord would arise between the United States and France in the ensuing campaign; that in its operation it would be sudden and critical, and that there was a powerful party against the independence of the United States; that the British Court, as they had always done, propagated and spread these suggestions throughout Europe, and were the more at large in the calumny, that some impressions might remain in consequence of the heat of the calumny; that although his most Christian Majesty paid no attention to these suggestions, yet he most strongly recommended concord without meaning in any matter to look into or interfere in the internal measures of the United States. That such being the disposition of the Cabinet the beginning of October, the Court of Spain had thereupon taken her final resolution, as expressed by her remonstrance to the Court of London the end of that month, respecting her hostile operations against France, making the independence of the United States the preliminary article to a general pacification; that it was possible this would lead to a general peace, and that the negociations would necessarily be rapid, as peace or war must finally be determined upon before the season for opening the campaign came on. That as the Court of France had no object in view but the independence of the United States, if this was to be obtained there was a great probability of peace; but if it could not be obtained, his most Christian Majesty would exert all his powers in the next campaign in prosecution of the war. That the Congress ought to lose no time in appointing a proper person to take a part in the expected negociations; that he should be furnished with ample powers, as well as the desires of Americans as her ultimatum, relaxing in the first as in his discretion he should see fit, the distance being too great, and the crisis too pressing, to admit of applications to Congress for instructions; that the United States should consider their resources and their abilities on the one hand, and the probable advantages and disadvantages arising on the other, by continuing the war; that moderate terms might, perhaps, be now obtained; that the pride of Great Britain was too high, and her abilities too great, to submit to extraordinary demands at present. She might be able to continue the war for some years yet. France desired no aggrandizement by conquest, the Independence of America being alone such a debilitating of Great Britain, as to secure her effectually against the haughtiness of that nation. That the Court of Great Britain had endeavored to form alliances upon the Continent; that twenty months ago she had applied to the Empress of Russia for a body of her troops for the American service; that she replied she had not been raised to empire by Providence for such a purpose; that she would not send her troops against a people who asked only for justice and liberty; she would not engage in such a bloody work. In short, she answered with such disdain, that the British ambassador retired from Court till he received instructions on that head from London; that these instructions were in such mild terms, that he returned as if nothing had happened; that afterwards he applied to the Empress that her Majesty should act in strict conjunction with the British, and that a large district in America would be assigned to the Empress; but she answered this in such a manner, as discouraged a renewal of the application. That Britain had also proposed to the King of Prussia to loan an army of observation, with the view of collecting to it such forces as were against the interests of the Emperor; that the King, the Emperor, and the Queen of Hungary, had applied to his Master to mediate in the disputes relative to Bavaria; that he being in alliance with Vienna, had not chosen to be alone the arbiter, but had called upon Russia to be a co-umpire, to which the King of Prussia and the Emperor had consented; that the Empress of Russia had desired of the King of France to mediate between her and the Porte; that thus it appeared none of the Great Powers of Europe would take part against France, and that Great Britain was destitute of alliances against his Master; that Spain wished to have territorial claims of the United States terminated. She wished to have the navigation of the Mississippi shut, and possession of the Floridas; that she disliked the neighborhood of the British in that quarter, who were too restless and enterprising, and preferred that of the United States; that if the war continued, a subsidy might be obtained of Spain in aid of the pecuniary wants of the United States; that this aid was most honorable to protect States to obtain under the mark of a subsidy; that it might at a loose rate call for 6,000 men, when not more than 3,000 would be expected to be embodied for the reduction of the Floridas, to be relinquished to Spain when conquered; that Spain might obtain that territory independent of the States; that if a peace now took place, Spain would have no claim upon the United States, nor would they have any upon the Floridas; that if this subsidy took place, the money might be lodged in respectable private hands in Paris, and if prudently managed would give the States a credit in Europe equal to their wishes; that at all events the United States should exert themselves to prepare for another campaign, and put on the appearance of aiming at more than they meant to strike at; for such an appearance would accelerate the negociations, especially if the United States could strike a blow, which, though not important, might be brilliant; that peace was the time for the United States to recover their finances; that France had just begun to recover hers when hostilities begun between her and Britain; that had those hostilities been postponed two years, she would be more competent to the war; that, however, France had made every necessary arrangement for the next campaign. But that, as her exertions, and maintenance of 60,000 men on the frontiers of Germany, to enforce her umpirage, would occupy all her resources, she was not able to afford those aids to America, which she was disposed to do, considering as she did the interests of America as her own. (From Documentary History of the American Revolution, by Gibbes, Volume 2, p. 101) Doc ID: Gibbes, v. 2, p. 101 Date: 2/15/1779 |
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