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[v. 3, No. 97.] Lord Rawdon to Earl Cornwallis From Tarlton's Southern Campaigns. MONK'S CORNER, May 24, 1781. The situation of affairs in this Province has made me judge it necessary, for a time, to withdraw my force from the back country, and to assemble what troops I can collect at this point. I hope a recital of the circumstances which have led to this determination will satisfy your lordship as to the expediency of the measure. After the action of the 25th of April, (an account of which I had the honour of transmitting to your lordship) Major General Greene remained for some days behind the farthest branch of Granby's Quarter Creek. A second attempt upon his army could not, in that situation, be undertaken upon the principle which advised the former. In the first instance, I made so short an excursion from my works, that I could venture, without hazard, to leave them very slightly guarded; and I had the confidence, that, had fortune proved unfavorable, we should easily have made good our retreat, and our loss, in all probability, would not have disabled us from the farther defence of the place. To get at General Greene in his retired situation, I must have made a very extensive circuit, in order to head the creek, which would have presented to him the fairest opportunity of slipping by me to Camden; and he was still so superior to me in numbers, that, had I left such a garrison at my post as might enable it to stand an assault, my force in the field would have been totally unequal to cope with the enemy's army.I had much to hope from the arrival of reinforcements to me, and little to fear from any probable addition to my antagonist's force. Whilst, upon that principle, I waited for my expected succours, Gen. Greene retired from our front, and, crossing the Wateree, took a position behind Twenty-five Mile Creek. On the 7th of May, Lieut. Col. Watson joined me with his detachment, much reduced in number through casualties, sickness, and a reinforcement which he had left to strengthen the garrison at George Town. He had crossed the Santee near its mouth, and had recrossed it a little below the entrance of the Congaree. On the night of the 7th, I crossed the Wateree at Camden ferry, proposing to turn the flank and attack the rear of Greene's army, where the ground was not strong, though it was very much so in front. The troops had scarcely crossed the river, when I received notice that Greene had moved early in the evening, upon getting information of my being reinforced, I followed him by the direct road, and found him posted behind Swaney's creek. Having driven in his pickets, I examined every point of his situation; I found it every where so strong, that I could not hope to force it without suffering such loss as must have crippled my force for any future enterprise; and the retreat lay so open for him, I could not hope that victory would give us any advantage sufficiently decisive to counterbalance the loss. The creek (though slightly marked in the maps) runs very high into the country. Had I attempted to get round him, he would have evaded me with ease; for, as his numbers still exceeded mine, I could not separate my force to fix him in any point, and time (at this juncture most important to me) would have been thus unprofitably wasted. I therefore returned to Camden the same afternoon, after having in vain attempted to decoy the enemy into action, by affecting to conceal our retreat. On the 9th I published to the troops, and to the militia, my design of evacuating Camden, offering to such of the latter as chose to accompany me every assistance that we could afford them. During the ensuing night I sent off all our baggage, &c., under a strong escort, and destroyed the works remaining at Camden, with the rest of the troops, till ten o'clock the next day, in order to cover the march. On the night of the 13th, I began to pass the river at Nelson's ferry, and by the evening of the 14th, every thing was safely across. Some mounted militia had attempted to harass our rear guard on the march; but a party of them having fallen into an ambuscade, the rest of them gave us no farther trouble. We brought off all the sick and wounded, excepting about thirty, who were too ill to be moved, and for them I left an equal number of continental prisoners in exchange. We brought off all the stores of any kind of value, destroying the rest; and we brought off not only the militia who had been with us at Camden, but also all the well-affected neighbors on our route, together with the wives, children, negroes and baggage, of almost all of them. My first news, upon landing at Nelson's, was, that the post at Motte's house had fallen. It was a simple redoubt, and had been attacked formally by sap. Lieut. M'Pherson had maintained it gallantly till the house in the centre of it was set in flames by fire arrows, which obliged his men to throw themselves into the ditch, and surrender at discretion. But as Major M'Arthur had joined me with near three hundred foot and eighty dragoons, I conceived I might, without hazarding too far, endeavor to check the enemy's operations on the Congaree. On the 14th, at night, I marched from Nelson's, and on the evening of the 15th I reached the point where the roads from Congarees and M'Cord's ferry unite. Various information was brought to me thither, that Greene had passed the Congaree, at M'Cord's ferry, and had pushed down the Orangeburgh road. The accounts though none of them positive or singly satisfactory, corresponded so much, that I was led to believe them, and the matter was of such moment, that it would not admit of my pausing for more certain information; therefore, after giving the troops a little rest, I moved back to Eutaws the same night, but hearing nothing there, I pursued my march hither. By my present situation, I cover those districts from which Charles Town draws its present supplies. I am in readiness to improve any favourable occurrence, and guard against any untoward event. It is a secondary, but not a trifling advantage, that I have been able to supply the troops with necessaries; for the want of which, occasioned by the long interruption of our communication, they suffered serious distresses. I am using every effort to augment our cavalry, in hopes that the arrival of some force will speedily enable us to adopt a more active conduct. (From Documentary History of the American Revolution, by Gibbes, Volume 3, p. 77) Doc ID: Gibbes, v. 3, p. 77 Date: 5/24/1781 |
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