|
Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, K. B. dated York town, Virginia, October 20, 1781. SIR, I HAVE the mortification to inform your excellency, that I have been forced to give up the posts of York and Gloucester, and to surrender the troops under my command, by capitulation on the 19th instant, as prisoners of war to the combined forces of America and France. I never saw this post in a very favourable light: But when I found I was to be attacked in it in so unprepared a state, by so powerful an army and artillery, nothing but the hopes of relief would have induced me to attempt its defence; for I would either have endeavoured to escaped to New York by rapid marches from the Gloucester side, immediately on the arrival of General Washington's troops at Williamsburgh, or I would, notwithstanding the disparity if numbers, have attacked them in the open field, where it might have been just possible that fortune would have favoured the gallantry of the handful of troops under my command: But being assured by your excellency's letters, that every possible means would be tried by the navy and army to relieve us, I could not think my self at liberty to venture upon either of those desperate attempts; therefore, after remaining for two days in a strong position, in front of this place, in hopes of being attacked, upon observing that the enemy were taking measure which could not fail of turning my left flank in a short time, and receiving on the second evening your letter of the 24th of September, informing met that the relief would fail about the 5th of October, I withdrew within the works on the night of the 29th of September, hoping by the labour and firmness of the soldiers to protract the defence until you could arrive. Every think was to be expected from the spirit of the troops; but every disadvantage attended their labour, as the work was to be continued under the enemy's fire, and our stock of intrenching tools, which did not much exceed four hundred when we began to work in the latter end of August, was not much diminished. The enemy broke ground on the night of the 30th,m and constructed on that night, and the two following days and nights, two redoubts, which, with some works that had belonged to our outward position, occupied a gorge between two creeks or ravines, which came from the river on each side of the town. On the night of the 6th (a.) of October they made their first parallel, extending from its right on the river to a deep ravine on the left, nearly opposite to the center of this place, and embracing our whole left, at the distance of six hundred yards. Having perfected this parallel, their batteries opened on the evening of the 9th, against our left; and other batteries fired at the same time against a redoubt over a creek upon our right, and defended by about one hundred and twenty men of the 23d regiment and marines, who maintained that post with uncommon gallantry. The fire continued incessant from heavy cannon, and from mortars and howitzers, throwing shells from eight to sixteen inches,, until all our guns on the left were silenced, our work much damaged, and our loss of men considerable. On the night of the 11th (b.) they began their second parallel, about three hundred yards nearer to us. The troops being much weakened by sickness, as well as by the fire of the besiegers, and observing that the enemy had not only secured their flanks, but proceeded in every respect with the utmost regularity and caution, I could not venture so large sorties, as to hope from them any considerable effect; but otherwise, I did every thing in my power to interrupt their work, by opening new embrazures for guns, and keeping up a constant fire with all the howitzers and small mortars that we could man. On the evening of the 14th, they assaulted and carried two redoubts, that had been advanced bout three hundred yards for the purpose of displaying their approaches, and covering our left flank, and during the night included them in their second parallel, on which they continued to work with the utmost exertion. Being perfectly sensible that our works could not stand many hours after the opening of the batteries of that parallel, we not only continued a constant fire with all our mortars, and every gun that could be brought to bear upon it, but a little before daybreak, on the morning of the 10th, I order a sortie of about three hundred and fifty men, under the direction (c.) of Lieutenant-colonel Abercrombie, to attack two batteries which appeared to be in the greatest forwardness, and to spike the guns. A detachment of guards, with the 80th company of grenadiers, under the command of Lieutenant-colonel Lake, attacked the one; and one of light infantry, under the command of Major Armstrong, attacked the other; and both succeeded, by forcing the redoubts that covered them, spiking eleven guns, and killing or wounding about one hundred of the French troops who had the guard of that part of the trenches, and with little loss on our side. The action, though extremely honourable to the officers and soldiers who executed it, proved of little public advantage; for the cannon having been spiked in a hurry, were soon rendered fir for service again; and before dark the whole parallel and batteries appeared to be nearly complete. At this time we knew that there was no part of the whole front attacked on which we could show a single gun, and out shells were nearly expanded: I therefore had only to chuse between preparing to surrender next day, or endeavouring to get off with the greatest part of the troops; and I determined to attempt the latter, reflecting, that though it should prove unsuccessful in this immediate object, it might, at least, delay the enemy in the prosecution of farther enterprizes. Sixteen large boats were prepared, and upon other pretexts were ordered to be in readiness to receive troops precisely at ten o'clock: With these I hoped to pass the infantry during the night; abandoning our baggage, and leading a detachment to capitulate for the town's people, and the sick and wounded; on which subject a letter was ready to be delivered to General Washington. After making my arrangements with the utmost secrecy, the light infantry, greatest part of the guards, and part of the 23d regiment, landed at Gloucester; but at this critical moment, the weather, from being moderate and calm, changed to a violent storm of wind and rain, and drove all the boats, some of which had troops on board, down the river. It was soon evident, that the intended passage was impracticable; and the absence o the boats rendered it equally impossible to bring back the troops that had passed, which I hard ordered about two in the morning. In this situation, with my little force divided, the enemy's batteries opened at daybreak: The passage between this place and Gloucester was much exposed, but the boats having now returned, they were ordered to bring back the troops that had passed during the night, and they joined in the forenoon without much loss. Our works in the mean time were going to ruin; and not having been able to strengthen them by abbatis, nor in any other manner than by a sight fraizing, which the enemy's artillery were demolishing wherever they fired, my opinion entirely coincided with that of the engineer and principal officers of the army, that they were in any places assailable in the forenoon, ad that by the continuance of the same fire for a few hours longer, they would be in such a state as to render it desperate, with our numbers, to attempt to maintain them. We at that time could not fire a single gun; only one eight-inch and little more than a hundred cohorn shells remained; a diversion by the French ships of war that lay at the mouth of York river was to be expected. Our numbers had been diminished by the enemy's fire, but particularly by sickness; and the strength and spirits of those in the works were much exhausted by the fatigue of constant watching and unremitting duty. Under all these circumstances, I thought it would have been wanton and inhuman to the last degree to sacrifice the lives of this small body of gallant soldiers, who had ever behaved with so much fidelity and courage, by exposing them to an assault, which, from the numbers and precaution of the enemy, could not fail to succeed. I therefore proposed to (d.) capitulate, and I have the honour to inclose to your excellency the copy of the correspondence between General Washington and me on that subject, and the terms of the capitulation agreed upon. I sincerely lament that batter could not be obtained; but I have neglected nothing in my power to alleviate the misfortune and distress of both officers and soldiers. The men are well clothed and provided with necessaries, and I trust will be regularly supplied by the means of the officers that are permitted to remain with them. The treatment, in general, that we have received from the enemy since our surrender, has been perfectly good and proper: But the kindness and attention that has been shewed to us by the French officers in particular, their delicate sensibility of our situation, their generous and pressing offer of money, both public and private, to any amount, has really gone beyond what I can possible describe, and will, I hope, make an impression on the breast of every officer, when ever the fortune of war should put any of them into our power. Although the event has been so unfortunate, the patience of the soldiers in bearing the greatest fatigues, and their firmness and intrepidity under a persevering fire of shout and shells, that I believe has not often been exceeded, deserved the highest admiration and praise: A successful defence, however, in our situation was, perhaps, impossible; for the place could only be reckoned an intrenched camp, subject in most places to ensilade, and the ground, in general, so disadvantageous, that nothing by the necessity of fortifying it as a post to protect the navy, could have induced any person to erect works upon it. Our force diminished daily by sickness and other losses, and was reduced when we offered to capitulate, on this side, to little more than three thousand two hundred rank and file fir for duty, including officers' servants and artificers; and at Gloucester, about six hundred, including cavalry. The enemy's army consisted of upwards of eight thousand French, nearly as many continentals, and five thousand militia. They brought an immense train of heavy artillery, most amply furnished with ammunition, and perfectly well manned. The constant and universal chearfulness and spirit of the officers in all hardships and dangers deserve my warmest acknowledgments; and I have been particularly indebted to Brigadier-general O'Hara and lieutenant-colonel Abercrombie, the former commanding on the right, and the latter on the left, for their attention and exertion on every occasion. The detachment of the 23d regiment and of the marines, in the redoubt on the right, commanded by Captain Apthorpe, and the subsequent detachments, commanded by Lieutenant-colonel Johnson, deserve particular commendation. Captain Rochfort, who commanded the artillery, and, indeed, every officer and soldier of that distinguished corps, and Lieutenant Sutherland, the commanding engineer, have merited in every respect my highest approbation: And I cannot sufficiently acknowledge my obligations to Captain Symonds, who commanded His Majesty's ships, and to the other officers and seamen of the navy, for their active and zealous co-operation. I transmit returns of our killed and wounded; the loss of seamen and town's people was likewise considerable. I trust your excellency will please to hasten the return of the Bonetta, after landing her passengers, in compliance with the article of capitulation. Lieutenant-colonel Abercrombie will have the honour to deliver this dispatch, and is well qualified to explain your excellency every particular relating to our past and present situation. I have the honour to be, &c. CORNWALLIS (From A History of the Campaigns of 1780 and 1781, in the Southern Province of North America?, by Lieutenant-Colonel Tarleton, pp427-433.) Tarleton, Ch 6., [W], p. 427 10/20/1781 |
Last modified: 7/13/01/PLW.
URL: http://www.southcarolinahistoricalsociety.org/displays/RevWar/archives-online/Tarleton__Ch_6___[W]__p__427.html